Of Business Losses and Government Help

In recent days JPMorgan Chase bank announced that it suffered $2 billion in trading losses, and Washington is all a-twitter.  You would think that a government that runs deficits of one and a half trillion dollars would hardly notice any event of $2 billion, but the chattering classes who think that they should have some role in running everything are all chattering about it and how it clearly demonstrates the need for more regulation, i.e. more need for them to be involved in running private businesses.

Mind you, JPMC’s $2 billion loss is a lot of money to you and me, but this does not particularly affect you and me.  JPMC suffered the loss, and given the size of the bank and its earnings (it usually makes somewhere in excess of $4 billion each quarter) it will little affect its bottom line.  JPMC is not asking anyone else to cover its losses, other than its own shareholders, and they will not feel it much if the bank continues to be as well run as it has been.

Ah, but perhaps you are thinking that JPMC got some of that TARP money so involved in the financial panic.  That is true, JPMC was one of the banks whose arms were twisted hard by Treasury Secretary Paulson to take a forced government investment.  Those TARP investments spooked regular, private sector investors, who immediately ran for the sidelines, and the financial crisis was on, propelled (as most are) by bad government efforts to “fix” things.  JPMC did not want the money or need the money and in a few months paid it all back—with substantial interest—as quickly as Congress and the regulators would allow them to.  It reminds me of the elderly gentlemen who finally yielded to family cajoling to take a ride in a stunt plane.  Afterward he thanked the pilot for the two rides, his first and his last.  TARP was such a bad deal for those who received the investments (except for the couple of financial firms that might really have wanted it), that I do not think that any would want a second ride, perhaps not even again at gunpoint.

The recent loss by JPMC, in any event, was one well covered by the bank’s earnings in other of its many lines of business.  Curiously, I do not hear the chattering classes get exercised when each quarter Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac announces several more billions of dollars of losses, losses that they do ask for the Treasury Department to make whole.  Maybe that is because the regulators already run Fannie and Freddie.  Actually, there was a little bit of noise in the past few days when Fannie Mae announced that it had actually turned a profit for the last quarter, the first time in years.

One thing that disturbs me in all of the Washington humbuzzah over JPMC’s trading loss is the implicit notion that there is something wrong about a business losing money on an investment, something wrong enough to call forth a government role.  It seems to me that losses are just as much a sign of a normal market as gains are, that healthy markets have a good share of both.  Nobody seemed to lose money during the housing bubble, no matter what they did, but that was hardly a sign of a healthy market place.

What markets do when they are allowed to is reward good business decisions and punish bad ones, with gains and losses providing some of the most effective means of helping businessmen and their investors understand truly which is which.  JPMC made some bad business decisions and lost money, and the counterparties to those trades made good ones and earned money.  What role can government play in all of that other than to mess it up?

To get government involved in this process rests upon at least two preposterous notions.  First, it suggests that it is somehow the role of government to make sure that businesses do not lose money, otherwise, why all the fuss?  That, of course, was the Soviet business model that did so much to create modern Russia.  Second, and following on the first mistaken notion, it supposes that government officials will know better how to avoid business losses.  Anyone really believe that?  Share with me your examples, and I will pass them on to the Federal budget planners.

Of Good King Wenceslas and Government Charity

Just past Easter and far enough away from Christmas I suppose that it is safe enough for me to write a few words in criticism of what I think is my least favorite Christmas carol.  I love Christmas carols and have many favorites.  There is one, however, that I particularly do not like:  “Good King Wenceslas.”  As I understand the case, the carol was written in Britain in the 1800s based upon legend and traditions dating from many centuries earlier.

Upon reflection I have to admit that I very much like the tune and often find myself whistling it, despite the fact that I very much dislike the words.  Actually, the words can be kind of fun, too, but I find their message repulsive.

Here are the words and message, or at least the first three stanzas, where most of the harm lies.  First stanza:

Good King Wenceslas looked out

On the feast of Stephen

When the snow lay round about

Deep and crisp and even.

Brightly shone the moon that night

Though the frost was cruel

When a poor man came in sight

Gathering winter fuel.

All very pretty.  A wealthy man of power enjoying a holiday associated with charity for the poor.  It is night time, with the moon shining on a smooth landscape of deep, white snow.  It is cruelly cold, but of course the king is surely nice and warm, enjoying the beautifully charming view.  The cherry on this lovely winter dessert is provided by the quaint and appropriate arrival of a poor man trudging through the snow. 

It is almost impossible to have a Christmas story nowadays without someone in poverty to bless the tale.  Poverty is so worshiped at Christmas time that it makes one wonder whether the poor in the stories are poor enough, as if to make one glad for the ready supply of poor people and even tremble at the thought of the supply ever becoming short.  No problem with that in Europe, especially old Europe.  And of course traditional Asian societies and all but few modern African ones rest upon having large and ready supplies of poor people, with the modern doctrines of communism and socialism superimposed upon them to institutionalize poverty and ensure that its alleviation can be an eternal goal ever to be invoked but never to be achieved.  One of the world’s criticisms of America is that our “poor” live so much better than even the well to do of much of the rest of the world, but the current American presidential team has been working mightily on addressing that criticism.

It is very important that you take note of what the poor man of poverty is doing on this bitter cold and crisp evening, the very night after Christmas.  He is gathering firewood, something that it would be more than unpleasant to be without in such a cruel frost.

With the second verse the plot deepens:

“Hither page and stand by me

If thou know’st it, telling

Yonder peasant, who is he?

Where and what his dwelling?”

“Sire, he lives a good league hence

Underneath the mountain

Right against the forest fence

By Saint Agnes’ fountain.”

This tells us much, far more I think than many who sing this song perceive.  In this oppressive cold darkness with only the cold moon for light the peasant had wandered a good three miles from his home in search of something to burn to keep himself warm, three miles (the English league is 5280 yards).  Moreover, it could be expected that the home three miles away was colder still, being in close proximity to "the mountain."  Perhaps these points are not missed by the casual caroler, but does the caroler also note that the peasant lives next to a forest?  As we look at the next stanza, keep in mind this question:  why would someone who lives next to a forest walk a good three miles in search of something to burn?

“Bring me bread and bring me wine,

Bring me pine logs hither.

Thou and will I see him dine

When we bear him thither.”

Page and monarch forth they went,

Forth they went together

Through the rude wind’s wild lament

And the bitter weather.

It is at this point in the song where it is intended that we who sing or hear the words are to begin to be warmed.  Touched by the predicament of the poor peasant, wandering a good three miles the day after Christmas to gather firewood just to stay warm on that bitterly frigid night (we are informed in this verse that the cold was made intense by a rude wind), the good king not only sees to the provision of firewood for the poor man but deigns to deliver the wood himself, along with bread and wine.  This is the core of the story of the song, confirmed in the remaining verses by the miracle of the page, nearly freezing to death on the king’s errand of mercy, finding warmth by stepping in the very snowy footsteps of his master.

Before I continue with my criticism, I will add that I entirely agree with the last lines of the carol, the moral of the story:

Therefore, Christian men, be sure

Wealth or rank possessing

Ye who now will bless the poor

Shall yourselves find blessing.

This is all very true, demonstrated repeatedly throughout history.  I would add that any person, of any rank or means, who gives of himself to bless the poor will find blessings in return, occasionally blessings on earth and always blessings where moth and rust do not corrupt.

And giving of oneself is the point.  Was Good King Wenceslas really giving of himself?  This was the king, giving of the royal resources.  I seriously doubt that the king baked the bread, or pressed the wine, or chopped the wood that he was providing.  They very likely came from some other poor peasants (in some degree even from this peasant himself) in the form of a tax by one name or another.  It is all very nice to be generous with other people’s sweat.  All very Old World, nice and feudal.  That was the way of things in those days. 

Moreover, and in answer to the question that I posed earlier, the poor peasant had trudged three miles, looking for something in the deep snow that he might be able to burn, when he lived right next to the forest, because the forests all belonged to the royalty.  It was a serious crime for any peasant—regardless of how close he lived—to “poach” either firewood or game out of that forest.

That is to say, that Good King Wenceslas, overcome by a moment of pity, was acting to relieve for a moment a misery that he himself participated in causing and inflicting.  Given the age, I am sure that the poor man was appropriately grateful as the king and his page watched the poor man eat in his hovel, and all were appropriately warmed in heart and mind as the king returned to his castle for the rest of the winter.  The perpetuation of the legend has assured that the king received a bountiful blessing of good public relations for his gesture.

This all may be well and good for the land of the nineteenth century British monarchy, but any American should be ashamed to sing this song, other than in mockery.  Our Founders fought a revolution and gave their best efforts, and some gave their lives, to throw off monarchy and end royal forests and feudal domains.  They recoiled at the practices of corrupt monarchies who tried to ward off grievances against royal prerogatives and taxes by tossing the occasional crumbs of “charity” to the masses.  They saw through the game of taxing the people so that the governors could provide a few well advertised benefits to the many while quietly heaping largesse on their cronies.

None of that would be tolerated today in America.  Or would it?  How about a nation hungry for energy while plentiful supplies of energy lie locked up under government-owned lands, and all that the government offers are windmills and algae farms?  How about trillion dollar “stimulus” appropriations bills that build a bridge or a road here and there, while administration cronies walk off with billions of dollars in grants and loans not expected to be paid back?  How about major taxes on job providers to pay for some more government handouts while driving the job providers to cut back or close up shop?  The charity of modern governments is no more virtuous than it was at the hands of the old benevolent despots.

At least in the land of We the People our leaders do not inherit their jobs and can be thrown out for misrule.  Yet, the trick worked in Europe for Good King Wenceslas.  Will America’s own Good King Wenceslas be celebrating another Feast of Stephen in the White House, or will he be packing on Boxing Day?

Of Public-Private Partnerships and Public Corruption

One of the popular phrases in Washington that makes me cringe every time that I hear it is public-private partnership.   This is a foreign concept, alien to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.  The Founders fled from the institution.  It had a rich history in Europe, and our Founders hated it, because it tended toward abuse (as it does today).  They had been methodically abused by it.

One example, the infamous British East India Company was a public-private partnership that engaged in colonization in America and elsewhere (perhaps most notably, India), harnessing the colonies with oppressive collars of monopolies that forced the colonists to do business only through the Company that enjoyed the privileges and powers of the Crown.  Those privileges were used to underpay the colonists for what they produced and sold and overcharge them for what they bought.  Fortunately for America, the Founders became champion smugglers, taking advantage of a land with an extensive seacoast and rich with usable harbors.  The smuggling was fortunate also for Britain, for without it the new British colonies in America would have been strangled in their cribs.

The Boston Tea Party was a colonial revolt against monopoly powers exercised in the name of the British Government by the East India Company.  That this revolt took place in Boston was not unusual, as the power and influence of the Crown-endorsed Companies were stronger in Virginia and other places to the south than they were in New England.  The New Englanders were less accustomed to it and therefore felt its oppressions more keenly.  Crown companies had much less of a role (but were not unknown) in lands settled by freedom-seeking Puritans and Pilgrims.  The Jamestown Colonies were from the beginning Company expeditions.  But the Virginians and many other Americans grew increasingly weary of those public-private partnerships and the corruptions that they fomented.  The wide lands of North America encouraged a freedom that the public-private partnership of Crown and Companies was not able to stifle.

It took royal favor to create the public-private partnerships, and the maintenance of royal favor to continue them.  No surprise, then, that such favor had to be funded by steady payments from the partnership to the government officials possessing power to control the royal favors.  In exchange, government discretion, including the judging of right and wrong, was all too often influenced by what favored the partnership rather than what favored justice.

This was how public-private partnerships were corrupting on a personal level.  They were also corrupting to the State, corrosive of freedom.  In no small degree British freedoms from the King have been built by the power of taxation controlled by Parliament.  With great skill over centuries British Parliaments wielded the power of managing the government purse to win new freedoms from the British Kings.  Since there is money to be made by using government power in public enterprises, however, sovereigns can find ways to cash in on that value and avoid the accountability that comes with having to seek new taxes to pay for their programs.  In the great conflict between the Parliament and King Charles I, the King was long able to avoid resorting to Parliament and acceding to its demands for freedom by funding his operations through the sale of royal privileges to and by reaping revenues from the companies and other public-private partnerships.  He carried it too far and eventually lost his head, but the American Founders did not fail to learn the lesson.

Neither did our modern Presidents, many of whom have revealed a fondness for public-private partnerships as a means to extend government programs and influence, even to the exclusion of congressional and public oversight.  Franklin Roosevelt loved creating government-sponsored monopolies, even while giving many speeches against the evils of monopolies.  Today our economy is riddled with public-private partnerships, large and small, and they as always tend toward abuse. 

At the heart of the recent financial recession was the housing bubble supported by two of the greatest public-private partnerships in American history, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Created to promote government housing policy without using taxes or appropriations—and thereby escaping public accountability—their government privileges allowed them to borrow all the money they needed at prices little above government rates and use that advantage to drive competition out of the middle of the housing markets that they occupied.

When the housing bubble at last burst, the Treasury’s TARP used a public-private partnership with banks (most but not all of whom were unwilling partners) to push investors out of the banking markets and turn the financial crisis into a financial panic.  Once in office, the Obama Administration embraced TARP, to which they added a trillion dollar stimulus package that accelerated our budget deficit crisis.  The Obama stimulus package was lousy with public-private partnerships, a significant reason why it failed so miserably to stimulate our economy, destroying one or more jobs for each one that it promised to create through government favor.

The Faustian bargain at the core of the public-private partnerships corrupts all involved and touched by them:  the government that creates them, the partners who sell their souls for the advantages, and those disadvantaged by the whole unfairness.  Former Congressman Dick Armey—a foe of public-private partnerships—has often warned that when you partner with the devil, you are always the junior partner.

Of Government Debt and Historic Ratings

Apologists for the Obama administration desperately wish to make light of the unprecedented downgrading of the credit rating of U.S. Government debt from the virtually riskless category of AAA to the slightly riskier rank of AA. The apologists, when they cannot divert attention from the issue altogether, rely upon one or both of two arguments: 1) it was all a big mistake, an irrational and inappropriate decision; or 2) the downgrading does not really matter, it does not mean much.

Apology 1) merits this observation. Maybe it was a mistake. The other two major rating agencies so far have not taken a similar step, even while making noise about the possibility. That kind of public and open debate and disagreement is important for this land of free speech, most particularly with regard to opinions on government policies and their consequences.

The question of the ability of the U.S. to continue to service its debt is certainly open for debate. What is not debatable is that we are now in a condition where it is debatable. We have not been in a situation—since the emergence of the United States onto the world stage of major nations—where our ability to service our debt was at all in question. That we are is new, historic, and not disputed. Under the Obama Administration a lot of unthinkable things have suddenly become all too thinkable, from socializing medicine, or backing away from our support for Israel, to the government taking over the banking system. Add to that list of unthinkables the riskiness of U.S. Government debt.

Apology 2) is without merit. The noise from the Obama Administration suggests that it really does matter, a lot. It is important to note that the S&P decision came after the Congress and the Administration very predictably reached agreement on raising the debt ceiling. The issue is not about the debt ceiling. The issue would still exist if there were no debt ceiling. The issue is the natural debt ceiling, the one that comes when the debtor is no longer able to make good on his promises of repayment. The downgrade is advice to all investors anywhere in the world that the safety of U.S. Government debt can no longer be taken for granted. It has moved from being riskless to an investment that carries some risk—you may debate how much, but you can no longer deny that there is some.

Maybe there is great wisdom in that. Maybe all government debt, from any source, should be recognized as carrying risk. There is always political risk. History is replete with evidence that governments lie to their own people and to their investors, so perhaps a Triple-A “riskless” rating should never be given to any government promises. But apart from willingness to pay, to honor debt agreements, the recognition today is that the U.S. government debt is on a trajectory to where the government cannot—to where it will be unable to—honor its debt commitments.

That is not unprecedented. There are several historical examples where governments amassed debts that were too heavy to repay. It has usually led to the downfall of the governments. The Roman emperors tried to manage their uncontrolled spending on cheap popularity by debasing the coinage (a form of inflation) that wrecked the economy and eventually the empire itself. The debts of the English King Charles I led to rebellion that cost him his head in 1649. A similar chain of events brought on the French Revolution. More recently, the Soviet debt crisis of the 1980s set in motion the final events that broke up the USSR. Other sovereign debt crises are unfolding today before our eyes. All that S&P said was that the U.S. Government cannot act like it is immune from joining the sad list without making major changes in spending and borrowing programs.

Which is to say that the S&P decision matters greatly. There will be much debate about how much it matters, but only charlatans or simpletons will maintain that it does not matter at all. Once you have lost your virginity, there is no reclaiming it. It is a watershed to move from perceived risklessness of debt to the recognition of some risk. Risk costs money, as investors have to hedge against the possibility of some degree of non-payment, whether through changes in terms or through repayment in debased (inflated) currency.

Already investors are starting to move some of their money out of government debt—now exposed to greater market risk—into bank deposits where even with interest rates artificially depressed by the Federal Reserve the principal is not exposed to changes in market values. More significantly, an important anchor of certainty in our economy—the assumption of absolute security of U.S. Government debt—has been pulled up, rougher going for any ships that have to navigate an economy already turbulent with uncertainties.

In the early days of the Obama presidency the media and the President himself were eager to point out how this or that development was history-making, that this or that initiative was historic. Downgrading the credit rating of the debt of the U.S. Government is certainly historic. Let us hope that President Obama does not make any more history.

Of People and Government

One hundred-fifty years ago William Tecumseh Sherman was engaged in the early efforts to put down the rebellion in the southern slave states. He had the idea that it would require several hundred thousand troops. The savvy people of the day seriously thought that Sherman was crazy. After the war and more than a million soldiers later Sherman had another insightful comment:

My opinion is, the country is doctored to death, and if President and Congress would go to sleep like Rip Van Winkle, the country would go on under natural influences, and recover far faster than under their joint and several treatment.
(William T. Sherman, letter to General Ulysses S. Grant, February 14, 1868, in William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of William T. Sherman, p.922)

We need more Shermans today. No one knew better than Sherman what government could do militarily. He also knew its limitations and understood that military competence does not transfer to economic competence.

The federal government, having caused the recent economic turmoil and the resultant recession by an elaborate and pervasive system of guaranties and subsidies, then precipitating a financial panic with massive intervention programs that drove investors out of the markets, quickly followed up with new laws to take over the healthcare and financial systems, simultaneous with uncontrolled spending. The government has tried all that it can do—and far more than it should do. The government’s quack medicine recurrently and unpredictably applied, like in the 1930s, is making sure that private initiative has little chance for recovery.

This highlights the fundamental question: do you or do you not trust people. This is not a new question. It is as old as government, which is practically as old as time. The evidence of the ages is clear: trusting people is the only economic system that works.

The reason is not complicated. Government economic programs are run by men and women making decisions about things that they do not fully understand, applying their own incentives to other people’s money, property, and talents. As smart as these men and women might be—and they are neither smarter nor dumber than the rest of the population—they are not smart enough to know enough to run an economy of over 300 million individuals making billions of economic decisions every day. No mortal is, and until the Second Coming of Christ government remains in the hands of the mortals.

Fortunately, if you trust the people you do not need to make their choices for them. Leave them alone, and they will know best how to invest their money, how to create new jobs, how to invent new products, how to be more efficient, and they will do it in the best ways that they know how, because their own money, resources, and reputations are on the line. Those who are best at these many tasks will succeed the most.

Because government has different incentives and does not work that way, the founders of the United States adopted a government whose founding document begins with the words, “We the People”. Today we have a changing system of government, increasingly based upon the idea of, “You the People”, and it is not working very well. That formula never has.

Of Depressions and Government Rescues

The government is running out of things to do. I am referring to the economy and with reference to improving the economy. A successful government program to recover from the financial crisis and recession that the government caused is turning out to be much harder than presidential candidate Barack Obama promised.

All prolonged recessions and depressions are caused by governments. The recent financial crisis occurred, first, because the elaborate house of cards of government promises and guarantees that dominated the mortgage and housing markets was flattened by a puff of the wind of reality. With government reinforcement and in fact much prodding, builders were encouraged to build more houses bigger and faster than people could use them, realtors were rewarded for selling them, mortgage brokers were drawn to get mortgages for people who could not afford them, and investors were lured into thinking that there was no risk in pumping their money into funding these mortgages. Reality eventually took over, as it always does.

All of this would have caused a major recession, but former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson ensured that the recession would turn into a full blown financial panic. Nearly every Sunday in the fall of 2008 Paulson was on national camera, little hiding his deer-in-the-headlights expression, announcing the latest desperate and ill-conceived Federal financial rescue program. Remember that the disastrous $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (that was not used to purchase assets after all) was Paulson’s idea. The markets were spooked by it. Markets tanked when Congress defeated it and tanked again when Congress passed it about a week later (sweetened with enough pork to buy needed votes). Investors went on strike.

President Obama has been unsuccessful, coming up on three years, in ending the strike. In fact, each time investors have shown some interest in coming back some new government plan or program has renewed enough uncertainty to drive investors back to the sidelines. For example, in early 2009 bank stocks were starting to recover until the Administration decided to impose stress tests to see how banks would fair if the Obama recovery plan failed. Investors returned to their seats to watch, and even the regulators’ findings that the banks could weather continued recession did not bring more than a tepid response from bank investors. The Obama Administration’s plan to restructure the entire banking and financial system—realized in the Dodd-Frank Act—has served to warn investors against taking new investment risks until they could see how it would all play out. It now seems clear that the financial crisis has been replaced by a regulatory crisis, with the regulators already falling way behind the mandates of the last Congress to write hundreds of new rules and no bank able to make any business plans extending much beyond a few months.

The housing markets remain at depression levels. New Dodd-Frank rules are making it much harder for families to get, lenders to offer, and investors to fund new mortgages for new houses. Is an economic recovery even conceivable with housing and mortgage markets mired in depression?

Our government has tried pulling its other levers. The United States has never, ever, witnessed the amount of government spending intended to stimulate the economy artificially. The Federal Reserve has expanded the money supply by trillions of dollars. Most of that Federal Reserve money has gone into funding government deficits, driving down the value of the dollar, and stimulating the prices of gold, silver, oil, and other commodities. The government takeover of the healthcare system, it was argued, was the only way to control medical costs that were said to be harming the economy.

Of course, there are more government actions waiting in the wings. The Administration wants to raise taxes dramatically, especially on investors and businesses—the energy business, the banking industry, investment firms, anyone who uses carbon (one of the elements necessary to life and essential to breathing), “rich” people, and small businesses that would be caught in the definition of “rich people.”

And yet the economy remains in the doldrums. Nothing seems to work. It conjures up memories of the Great Depression, that economic recession that Franklin Roosevelt was eager to take over. Through the whole decade of the 1930s FDR tried one thing after another to restore economic recovery, but nothing worked. Instead, FDR helped weaken world faith in representative government, greatly encouraging the willingness of desperate people to embrace the desperate measures of the dictators in Italy, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union who gave us World War II.

The Obama Administration has tried everything that government can do. Why not now try getting government out of the way and letting the people solve this one as they always have? Investors still have plenty of money ready to invest, if they were only confident that the rules would not change and that their investments would not be taxed away. Businessmen would be eager to hire new employees if they only knew how much the employees would cost and that some new government program would not impose new costs and burdens on their business. Banks would love to lend to businesses and provide mortgages if the regulators would stop changing the rules and discouraging banks from making loans to anyone other than to the government.

Maybe there is the worry that government will not get credit for the recovery if there is no new government program to point to, no government guarantee to praise, no stimulus spending to trumpet. Maybe that would be O.K. But I would be ready to vote for the government leaders who removed the obstructions to investment, lowered tax rates, lifted regulatory burdens, and dispelled the clouds of regulations and barriers to growth that are gathering on the horizon.

Of Financial Panic and Lessons Learned

Late last month I met with a group of German businessmen. They were on a visit to improve international understanding through cross-Atlantic dialog. As you can imagine, they were most interested in how the economy was doing. The German economy is off to a quicker recovery than is the U.S. economy, but in all fairness the Germans have not had to overcome as much government help as we have (during and following the financial panic of 2008)—although they are very worried about having to swim while being chained to drowning economies like Greece and perhaps others of the European community.

Among the specific issues that they asked to discuss was the question, “Have we learned lessons from the recent world economic crisis?” As I pondered that question, I came up with a list of eight lessons that we perhaps have learned. There are certainly others you or I might add, but here are the eight lessons learned that I came up with at the time, in no particular order of priority:

1. Economic and financial models are not as good as advertised. Much of the financial regulatory program of recent years was based upon the notion that regulators and the firms that they regulated had come up with powerful models to identify how well financial firms and the economy were doing, models that could be relied upon to control the economy. In fact, confidence in models was so high, that policymakers were starting to rely upon them to help predict the future. It turns out that economic reality is far more complex than any models, regardless of how powerful the computers are that run them. Once again we have seen that no group of policymakers, regardless of how smart they are or how much information they have, can control the economy any more than they can control the weather, and we should not fault them for failing to do so. We can only fault them for trying.

2. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not the best run companies in the world. This lesson seems so painfully obvious that it is hard to believe that there was a time when people held them out as examples for emulation of corporate and financial management. But that was their reputation. We now know that the government privileges that they enjoyed allowed them to become sloppy in many crucial ways, especially in the management of their financial risk.

3. The biggest risk to the financial system is regulatory risk. Nearly every one of the financial firms that were strongly “persuaded” by policymakers to take government TARP money suffered market and reputational damage from those investments far worse than any financial challenges that they had. Nearly all of the largest recipients of TARP money paid it back as fast as the Congress and the regulators would let them, at a very expensive rate of interest. While a few have complained of these and other regulatory costs, more would if they were not afraid of the danger of being sent to the cornfield if they did, so they just say that it is “all very good” as their highest new costs today come from government regulations.

4. Economic reality always catches up with you, eventually. By the laws of economics, housing prices cannot long continue to exceed the rate of economic and population growth, but during the housing bubble the myth was that housing prices do not go down, at least not by much and not for long. The same was said about oil prices, by the way, as they grew even faster than housing prices. All came down, and all who believed and acted as if they would forever go up paid for expensive lessons. The same lesson is true today about government deficit spending. In spite of economic reality, too many policymakers act as if there is no limit to how much debt the government can put into the market. That false notion will crash on the rocks of economic reality, eventually.

5. Accounting rules, especially mark-to-market rules, are highly pro-cyclical. Accounting rule makers are on a multi-year crusade to force all companies to value practically everything by what you can sell it for in the market place right now. That means that in times of exuberant markets everything will look great and better than it really is, transferring market manias onto the financial books of companies. It also means that in times of panic, all things will look worse than they really are, accounting rules making sure that panic prices are written onto companies’ financial books. Mark-to-market financial rules were the amplifiers that helped puff up the housing balloon, just as they helped feed the subsequent financial panic.

6. You can hide risk, mask risk, but you cannot avoid risk. All economic growth comes from someone taking a risk. There is risk in whether a new invention will be well received in the market place, or whether a new store will succeed in its new location, or whether the new employees will do a good job, and on and on. There is a natural human tendency to want to harvest the rewards of investment without being exposed to its risks. So people try to get others to take that risk, or try to pretend it is not there, but the risk will be there, and the less obvious it is the less likely that people will take precautions to manage it. The biggest problem from the housing boom was that people thought that building houses and lending people mortgages to buy them were riskless, when in fact they are loaded with risk. A variety of things masked that risk. When it finally asserted itself, people who thought that they had made no-risk investments panicked. The same is happening today with people who invest in “no-risk” government securities. You might be able for a time to hide the risk; you cannot avoid it.

7. Bad underwriting is bad. When a lender decides to lend money he first evaluates the ability of the borrower to repay the loan. That evaluation is called underwriting, it is the lender making the determination that the loan is a good investment. Lenders and others will make mistakes: borrowers will get into unforeseen troubles, their new invention might not work as well as thought, their business might face a new and better competitor, some tax or new regulation might eat away anticipated profits. The lender expects that some small portion of loans will run into repayment problems, and the lender plans for that by setting aside reserves for loan losses. But when the lender does not pay attention to the risks that he can see, then he engages in bad underwriting, and no amount of reserves can absorb those losses. Would we have had a housing bubble and then a housing crash if so many mortgages were not provided to people who could not afford the houses that they were buying? Not enough lenders looked carefully enough into that question.

8. Financial firms cannot long offer products that policymakers and the public do not understand. Recent legislation and regulations are aimed at curbing some of the most successful financial products and practices, largely because policymakers and the public do not understand them. In times of financial turmoil, policymakers look for something to do, and one of the first things that they try to do is stop what they cannot understand. The public is vulnerable to the rants of people seeking to deflect criticism from their failings to products or practices that the public does not understand. The credit default swaps market was one of the few financial markets that worked extremely well throughout the recent financial turmoil, never freezing up while other markets pretty much stopped. As another example, bank investments in the securities markets—other than loans—were an important source of diversified income for banks, helping keep banks afloat when bank loans were suffering heavily from people and businesses that defaulted. Recent legislation and regulations are placing heavy new burdens on these profitable activities, and in some cases banning them entirely, because policymakers do not understand them. Financial firms have to be more active in explaining everything that they do, or they will continue to find many of their newest and best financial activities curbed in times of regulatory fear.

As I say, you can probably add to this list, as could I. As I ponder now the question that the German businessmen put to me, the actual lessons that we have learned seem to me less important than whether we will remember the lessons.

Of Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue

Who wants another financial crisis? To hear the advocates of the Administration’s financial regulation bill, anyone who disagrees with them does.

Let us walk past the discussion of others’ motives, important as they might be. Let us, you and I, agree that we do no want another financial crisis. Or, phrased better, let us agree that we would like to reduce the likelihood of another financial crisis and minimize the extent of crisis when it comes. Anyone believe that there will never be another one? Recognizing that crises will occur and that we will be better prepared to face them by acknowledging and preparing for their possibility, let us consider which approach is likely to work to reduce their frequency and their severity.

Which is more likely to be more effective at reducing the risk of financial crises: government regulators or market discipline? Relying upon experience as a reliable guide, the question is soon answered. Government was all over the most recent crisis. In fact, the most recent financial crisis was fomented by government regulations and stimulated into panic by unwise government actions, all of which worked to shield key players from market discipline. Government housing programs and guaranties led people to ignore the risks of mortgage lending—ignored by borrowers and lenders. Credit rating agencies (CRAs) were able to classify risky mortgage securities as nearly risk-free, shielded by the Securities and Exchange Commission from market pressures to identify risks that the CRAs were paid to find.

The crisis was fanned into a panic after the Paulson Treasury Department (1) orchestrated the bailout of the securities firm Bear Stearns, then (2) subjected investors to a big tease with Lehman Brothers which they at last decided not to bail out, (3) bailed out AIG, (4) bailed out bond investors in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and then (5) demanded from Congress $700 billion for the catastrophic Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). None of the TARP money was used to buy any troubled assets. A third of it went to bail out banks that were not in trouble (until they took the Treasury’s shilling) while other billions went to auto companies that were.

So why are the Administration and leaders in Congress on the verge of enacting legislation that will give Washington bureaucrats virtual control of any and all of the financial system at their whim? Could it be that these friends of regulation, who control the lawmaking powers this year, are unwilling to admit their mistakes? Or is it that the friends of regulation see the financial crisis—whatever its cause—as a wonderful opportunity to expand regulatory controls? Or maybe it is just that once you tell a story—that Wall Street caused the financial crisis—you have to carry the story on to its conclusion, however wrong that might be. In either case, the friends of regulation control the megaphones and the levers of power. If they have their way, though, Time will surely tell whether it was a good idea for Pennsylvania Avenue to replace Wall Street as the financial center of America.

Of Financial Reform Promises and Too-Big-to-Fail Firms

One of the many astonishing things about the Obama Administration’s financial regulatory legislation is that it promises so much and delivers so little of what it promises. In fact, in most cases it delivers the opposite of what it promises. Seemingly, the Administration knows what the American people want, so it uses promises of delivering what the people want and what the nation needs in order to enact changes that most Americans will neither want nor like.

As Senators and congressmen prepared to return to their states and districts the Administration published a list of “Top Ten Things You Should Know About Financial Reform.” Presumably this would serve as a guide to politicians giving their Memorial Day stump speeches. I heard one Democrat congressman at the Memorial Day ceremonies in Waterloo, New York. Neither the list nor the legislation found its way into his remarks. Good thing for the congressman, because the legislation as currently written fails on all ten of the “Things” that the Administration paperwork boasts that it delivers.

Let us examine Thing 1:

1) End of Too-Big-To-Fail: If a big financial firm is failing, it will have only one fate: liquidation. There will be no taxpayer funded bailout. Instead, regulators will have the ability to shut down and break apart failing financial firms in a safe, orderly way—without putting the rest of the financial system at risk, and without asking the taxpayers to pay a dime.

Part of that Administration statement is true, but only part of it, and not the most important part. The legislation would provide regulators with the ability to shut down and break apart failing financial firms. Regulators already have that authority today and have been exercising it weekly for the past two years to close down failed banks “without putting the rest of the financial system at risk, and without asking the taxpayers to pay a dime.” Failed non-bank firms have been closed down through bankruptcy proceedings—again, “without putting the rest of the financial system at risk, and without asking the taxpayers to pay a dime.”

The risk to the rest of the financial system and the demand for taxpayer bailouts have all come in the past few years as the federal government has gotten involved to prop up firms that the federal government did not want to fail. Prior to the recent financial crisis, too-big-to-fail was a theory. Treasury Secretary Paulson made it official policy and practice, which policies and practices have been officially approved and adopted by the new Administration.

The new financial regulatory legislation—even while making it easier for financial regulators to break up and unwind failing financial firms—would also give to regulators legal authority to bail them out, prop them up, and have them born again as clean firms, free of the financial encumbrances of all of their sins of the past. In very real and important ways the legislation would take the theory of too-big-to-fail, turned into official practice by the Paulson Treasury Department, and make it the law of the land.

There are several ways that the legislation would provide this service. One important tool is the new explicit ability of the FDIC (which would become the agency for handling not just failing banks but any failing firm that government leaders considered important enough for the FDIC’s care) to treat the investors in a failing firm differently. The FDIC would be explicitly authorized to protect some investors and not protect others, giving special attention to the customers of a firm and those who have lent money to the firm. Shareholders are supposed to be wiped out and the leaders of the firm fired, but the bondholders and counterparties doing business could be protected.

If this sounds familiar, this is exactly how the federal government has been treating housing giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. When the government took them over in late 2008, shareholders were nearly but not entirely wiped out, leaders were let go, but all of the bondholders, counterparties, and investors in debt securities of Fannie and Freddie became 100% protected by the federal government and remain so today. Several other participants in the financial system were “put at risk,” the government’s exercise of discretion to pick winners and losers precipitating the failure of several banks that were holding preferred shares of Fannie and Freddie that the government chose not to protect. The taxpayer has not been protected either, the Treasury deciding last Christmas Eve to allow Fannie and Freddie to receive unlimited federal support, already totaling hundreds of billions of dollars.

Fannie and Freddie are government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). The government subsidy programs for these GSEs would be the new model available for any firm designated as systemically significant by the federal government under this legislation. That is to say, that under this legislation, in place of two GSEs we would have potentially dozens.

There is a price for this attention. Whether a firm wants it or not, under this new legislation, if enacted, any firm could be given the GSE treatment. Once the government considered a firm to be “systemically” important it could be told in as much detail as the government leaders considered necessary exactly how to run its business. No part of the business of the firm would be exempt from the government’s reach. The federal government would become the effective partner of that firm. And as former Congressman Dick Armey once said, when you partner with government, the government is never the junior partner.

Now, ask yourself this real-world question: as senior partner, would the government ever let any of its partner financial firms fail? If, as is the case with Fannie and Freddie, by following government mandates the firm got so deep in the red that action became unavoidable, the federal government would be able to use another powerful tool in the proposed new law: the authority to create a “bridge bank." As the government has been doing with Fannie and Freddie—and as many suspect the government will do to “fix” Fannie and Freddie—government officials could take over the operations of the firm and use this bridge bank authority to protect whichever investors they wished and make others (not leaving out the taxpayer) suffer loss. Through a legal and financial “baptism” administered by the federal high priests of finance all of the sins of the failing firm could be gathered together into one “bad bank” and all of the remaining operations of the firm could emerge as a new firm washed completely clean of bad debts and uncollectible assets. The new firm could then be offered up again—either with the same name or a new one—to investors. Of course, the federal government would likely remain as senior partner, but this would give comfort to investors who, like investors in Fannie and Freddie, were looking for a place to put their money where the government would be expected to protect those investments.

Ending too-big-to-fail? In the Administration proposal too-big-to-fail becomes the law of the land. The Administration’s number one selling point for financial legislation is a very good reason to oppose its bill.

Of Financial Safety and Lost Liberty

Americans are about to lose more of their liberty, in a very big way. Like the oil leaking away from the deep well in the Gulf of Mexico, American financial liberty will be steadily draining off with few ideas on how to stop the leaking once it has begun.

First the housing markets panicked, then the Paulson Treasury panicked, and then the financial markets panicked. Now panic has hit Congress. Ignoring that the housing-financial crisis was set up and fomented by bad government regulatory programs, Congress is on the verge of enacting legislation that will give to government regulators authority to control any financial activity in the United States.

You may think that I am exaggerating a bit here, getting carried away by rhetoric. I wish that I were. Looking at the provisions of the legislation that the Senate is now debating and is scheduled to pass in the near future, I cannot think of a single financial transaction that government agencies would not be able to control. By control, I mean set rules as to how the transaction would be structured, to whom it could be offered, by whom it could be offered, how it could be advertised, how it would be priced, or even whether it could be offered at all.

Let us consider a simple financial service: a home equity line of credit, or HELOC. With a HELOC a customer can borrow money from the bank up to the amount of equity that the customer has in his house. The attractiveness of the HELOC is that you do not have to sell your house in order to use the equity in it to help pay for college, fund needed remodeling, or even start a small business. With the loan backed by the equity in the house, the borrower gets a far lower interest rate than he would without that collateral.

The legislation would create a new, totally independent federal bureau of consumer regulation. This new bureau—headed by a one person consumer czar endowed with power that would make an old Russian despot jealous—could determine, for example, that it would be “unfair” or “abusive” if the amount of money that a customer could borrow under a HELOC were reduced by the bank when the value of the customer’s house declined. I am not making this up. At a recent Federal Reserve meeting self-appointed consumer advocates, who would dominate the new bureau, complained that banks during the housing bust were lowering HELOC amounts for no good reason other than that home prices declined, neglecting that what makes a HELOC affordable is that it is backed by the value of the house. The value of the house goes down, so must the value of the collateral and the loan amount secured by the collateral. The law would not require, however, that the new consumer bureau be guided by common sense.

Other provisions of the proposed law would allow government agencies to break up any company in America, or make it set aside any reserves, or give up any line of business—and allow the agencies to play favorites by acting one way with one company and very differently with another—as long as the agencies claimed that their actions were appropriate to deal with systemic risks. The agencies would be the sole judges of what makes for a systemic risk. Or, to look at the authority another way, the federal financial agencies would be able to define what they consider to be “safe” financial conduct and effectively ban everything else, and steer individuals and businesses into government-identified safe financial activity.

In case the recent financial panics tempt you to think that all of this is a good idea, remember that we have tried this all before, and very recently. The example—housing—is staring us in the face. Maybe policymakers in Washington are too close to it all to notice.

In the housing fiasco, the government determined that mortgages were very safe (as demonstrated by Federal Housing Administration programs that allow homeowners to have a negative equity position on day one of their new government-guaranteed mortgages), that investing in mortgages was safe (hence the creation of government-sponsored Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to encourage investment in mortgage securities), that packaging mortgage securities was safe (as demonstrated by AAA ratings for packages of securities, awarded by credit rating agencies that were franchised by the Securities and Exchange Commission), and that housing assets on bank balance sheets were safe and worthy of incentives by regulatory standards that allowed banks to hold relatively little capital for their mortgage loans.

So, given how well the government identified safe financial activity in the housing markets we can expect the government officials to be equally mistaken in identifying other forms of safe financial activity. Even as I write this, government officials are working on new plans to establish rules to require banks to stock up on various types of government debt. These rules are based upon the near-sighted assumption that government debt is safe—ignoring the rising flood of Greek government debt, held back only temporarily by sandbags filled with fiat money from other European governments.

On the wall in my family room I have a framed $500 government bond. Only one coupon from it has been clipped, a semiannual payment for $15 in interest. The next coupon is payable on July 1, 1865, by the government of the Confederate States of America. That coupon and all the rest of the coupons through 1894 remain unredeemed. The proposal by Congress to exchange American financial freedom for the wisdom of government to identify safe financial activity has the crackle of Confederate money.

Of Government Collusion and Market Discipline

There is a lot of noise and confusion about what caused the recent financial panic. The Obama Administration believes that the basic problem is that markets do not work right, people are too dumb to choose for themselves, and that regulatory agencies were not able or were unwilling to keep up with bank shenanigans. Their solution: more of the same, that is, create a variety of new government agencies and bureaus that have the authority to dictate and control any part of or player in the financial system, including control of financial customers large and small (look in the mirror for the definition of financial customer). This neglects the fact that government agencies were the most blameworthy in the recent financial panic. In fact, it is impossible to have a long, sustained economic recession or depression without government policies causing it. (I will save for another day how the policies of the Federal Reserve and the Franklin Roosevelt administration made sure that an economic downturn became a depression lasting for a decade.)

Let me address the first of these points in the Obama administration’s justification for taking over the financial system. First of all let us consider the markets. It is true that the markets did not perform right. That was because government rules, structures, and programs did not allow the markets to perform right. The government guarantees bank deposits, so depositors do not care very much how safe or sound a bank is. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, bundle up mortgages into securities that investors assume have little or no risk. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approves and controls the small number of credit rating agencies, and investors believe that these agencies are right when they give to a particular company or investment their highest credit rating (such as AAA), a rating that is thought to present little or no risk. The SEC has protected these agencies from competition and from market discipline for their errors while providing little in the way of regulatory discipline.

With those and other government protections in place the appearance of risk just about disappeared from the mortgage markets. Different investors have different appetites for risk. It was not the people hungry for high risk returns that fueled the housing bubble. Many of those with the weakest appetite for risk, seeking the safest investments, were drawn to the mortgage markets. In this government-manufactured atmosphere of little or no risk, many mortgage firms, increasingly non-bank mortgage firms, made it more and more possible for people to buy houses that they could not afford. Once the mortgage firm made the mortgage, regardless of the ability of the borrower to repay, the firm sold the mortgage to the GSEs, who sold it on to investors who poured trillions of dollars into what they thought was a safe haven. Then the mortgage firm went on to make more mortgages. Investors were shielded from asking whether the mortgages were any good, that is, whether the person buying the house could actually afford it.

That mispricing of the risk pulled more and more money into mortgages and real estate, driving prices up and up, pulling in more and more investors as the prices rose, until it was impossible to put one more Jack on the house of cards without it tumbling down. People panicked when “safe” investments turned out to be risky. Then the government started panicking, bailing out some firms and not others, changing the rules almost weekly, demanding hundreds of billions of dollars from taxpayers in order to pick financial winners and losers. Investors, not knowing where the government would turn next, panicked some more.

It was government interference in the market that failed, not the markets. Without all of the government camouflage, investors would have insisted on knowing that the mortgage borrowers could afford their houses before funding loans to buy them. Ask yourself this: would we have had the whole housing blow up if people who could not afford to buy houses were not given mortgages? Yet the Obama Administration, even today, is tripping over itself to find new ways to guarantee new mortgages, in many cases especially for people who cannot afford their houses. Where have all the subprime mortgages gone? They have gone to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), where they have a government guaranty. (Watch what happens to the FHA house of cards in the coming months.) When will they every learn? Oh, when will they ever learn?

Giving more power to the kind of government agencies that helped create these problems hardly seems like the sensible answer. That is what the Obama Administration proposes, though. Instead of controlling the markets with more government interference and masking of risk, more bailouts for firms that should be allowed to fail, more power for some new government bureau to pick winners and losers and to tell people which financial products they can and cannot have, we should be exposing financial players more to market discipline. We should make it harder to hide risk and easier for investors to recognize the risks and allow the markets to charge higher prices for higher risks and lower prices for lower risks.

Market discipline has always been the quickest and surest regulator. It rewards the efficient provider of what the buyers in the market want, and it punishes the incompetent. Very importantly today, the market is stingy about bailouts.

Of Medicine Shows and Good Health

The nineteenth century offered a fertile field for the traveling salesman. As Americans spread across the continent, retailers stretched to keep up with them, and in many cases that was most efficiently done by peddling. Services and goods of all kinds were offered on the streets and in town squares by men just off the last train.

Most notorious of all of these salesmen was the one peddling the miracle cures, the snake oil salesman, the man with the medicine show. While for the most part the traveling salesman actually had a product with genuine utility (whether it was brushes, tools, or buttons), the wares of the medicine merchant rarely worked as advertised and often harmed the very people conned into buying. Frequently, the miracle potion was laced with opium, cocaine, or some other drug that gave a temporary euphoria while providing no cure. Dangerously, the magic elixir could lead to addiction.

Since these medicine showmen were unknown to their customers they had the tough task of gaining the interest and trust of their audience. They did their best to look good and sound good and entertain the crowd. Most of all, they needed to convince people that they had a problem, a big problem, a problem for which, luckily for the people of the town, the salesmen just happened to have the solution. The facts did not matter; assertions and promises were taken for facts. The trick was to get people worked up and then clinch the sale before the customers had time to give a second thought to what they were doing or a chance to look into the details. Bring phony testimonials onto the stage, but do not let potential customers talk with real people who had been “helped” before in this or some other town.

The medicine show seems back in style today, employing all of the advances of modern communications technology to play to an entire nation. Barack Obama, sounding good and looking good and giving a good performance, remains surprisingly unknown beyond his shallow stardom. With the help of a legion of shills, he is trying to overcome the thin trust he has with Americans and convince them that they are sick and getting much sicker. He tells the people that their healthcare system is broken, and his shills repeat the line in the media. He promises that the government—which has notoriously abused patients trapped in existing government-run healthcare programs like Medicare, military healthcare, and veterans health programs—can do better than the private system that most people choose and like. And he claims that the price is right, that this government healthcare will be better for less, that the new nationwide government programs will save money even by spending more.

In the crowd of every medicine show there is bound to be someone with the nerve to holler, “Quack!” The salesman will desperately try to divert the audience, urging listeners to pay no attention to the nay-sayers. If that does not work, then the salesman will try to get the crowd to drown out the contrary voices and start the medicine bottles moving. Congress has been incessantly urged by the White House to pass the new government program right away, first by August, and at least before the end of the year, because, well just because. The debate is over, we are told; it is now time to vote. The plan fans who do not want to debate anymore are eager to silence the critics who point to the obvious flaws, who ask how government’s failures with current healthcare programs qualify it to take on more, how spending trillions of dollars extra will reduce costs, how cutting half a trillion dollars from Medicare will not harm services. Do not slow down and think about what we are doing. Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain, the great and powerful Oz has spoken.

In the 1800s, the medicine shows did their harm, but most people were not deceived. When the quacks were not chased out of town, their audiences at last just turned away.

Of the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave

Each verse of our national anthem ends with the stirring phrase, “the land of the free and the home of the brave.” For nearly two centuries—this fall will mark the 195th anniversary of the writing of the “Star Spangled Banner,” by Francis Scott Key—these words have stirred Americans on the battlefield, on the frontier, in their homes, at their work, at their places of worship, even in the halls of government, stirred them to great and bold and noble action for the freedom and independence of our people and as an example to the rest of the world.

In recent times, in more or less accelerating fashion from the New Deal of the 1930s to an even quicker pace since the first of the year, too many of our governmental leaders have been trying their best to turn our nation into the land of the safe and the home of the careful. From the little child wearing a monstrous bicycle helmet as she rides her tricycle, through the proliferation of warning labels on virtually everything we buy or use, to the politically correct speech codes at work and on campus, to the honey sweet invitations for people to surrender to government control their health care and financial choices, Americans are in danger of losing the core of what makes us Americans: our freedom and our courage.

Freedom is the ability to choose, to make our own lives, to make of ourselves who we are and who we will present to God at the last day. Courage is the drive to draw upon the best within us and make the best and right choices, in spite of the odds, in spite of ridicule, to overcome danger. Courage is the father of all of our virtues, without which no virtue is possible.

When I was a child—not too many decades ago—my playmates and I often defended our decisions with the phrase, “It’s a free country.” I do not hear children say that anymore. Is it because it is not a free country, or that the freedom is not apparent, or that our children are not taught about freedom being at the core of what made the United States the beacon of hope for the world?

This November we will mark another anniversary, seven score and six years ago, when Abraham Lincoln called upon a nation of the free and the brave to a greater and continued exertion, so that “this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.” Is that call any less relevant and important and stirring to Americans today?

Of Freedom and the Bad Deal

Too many people in this country and elsewhere are making a Bad Deal with their government. Perhaps Americans have been slower to make the Bad Deal, because our nation was founded, and refounded with each new wave of immigrants, by people who were fleeing the Bad Deal in their own countries. The Bad Deal is, we surrender part of our freedom to our government in exchange for a promise that the government will remove from us some of the risks of our bad decisions.

Businessmen make good and bad decisions. With the good decisions, they provide a very popular good or service in exchange for which they make a lot of money. With the bad decisions, people either do not want the good or service or they can find it somewhere else cheaper. The businessman makes less money or may even go broke and lose his investment.

In most countries, that is considered too chaotic and disorganized. That is particularly so when it comes to big businesses. Even where such countries will let small businesses fail, they keep the big businesses propped up.

With the loss of the risk of failure, the benefits of successful risk taking grow anemic. The folks in the government providing the protection from failure demand a piece of the action. In the more clumsily corrupt countries, government officials take bribes or are directly invested in the protected business. In the more sophisticated countries, the process of “sharing” in the prosperity of the protected business is more camouflaged. There are special taxes and fees paid to the government, or the business is guided by the government into activities that benefit the current government leadership and its friends.

The housing loan giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are examples of that in our country. They were created by Congress and given special privileges that stifled competition and lowered their costs, allowing their businesses to expand until they became two of the largest companies in the United States. Investors lent them an unending supply of money at very low interest rates on the assumption that the government would never let the companies fail. In exchange, Fannie and Freddie had very elaborate programs for making Congressmen and Senators look good in their districts, with fancy press conferences where Fannie or Freddie officials bragged about all the mortgages supported in the district and how important the Congressman or Senator had been to Fannie’s or Freddie’s success.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac gave up significant freedom of decision in their business plans in order to get the government protection. Their experience, though, demonstrates a central problem of the Bad Deal: while the government promises to protect us from consequences of our bad decisions, it does not protect us from bad decisions by government. At last the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac house of cards tumbled down. It happened when the bad decisions urged on them by their government “friends” left the firms powerless to withstand the swirling winds from the air escaping out of the housing balloon. Fannie and Freddie helped puff up the balloon under government guidance together with other failed government programs. The firms failed, and the government had to take the companies over entirely.

Now the Obama Administration is offering to take over the consumer’s job of making his own financial decisions. They propose a new consumer regulator to stand in the consumer’s place, with the assignment to design all of the financial products that banks and other firms must offer to their customers. Normally customers and financial companies have figured this out among themselves in the market place. The Administration calls these new products (to be designed by a five-man board in Washington) “plain vanilla” products. The Obama Administration believes that simple is better. If you do not want plain vanilla, if you need a loan or a checking account or a savings account or a credit card with some extra features, good luck, because the new agency will be poised to pounce on any financial firm that dares offer it to you. It reminds me of the old Model T Ford. You could get it in any color you wanted, as long as the color was black. Thank goodness Chevrolet came along and offered blue, or we would never have had Mustangs.

Which again is the point: when government makes the decisions, there is little incentive for things to get better. In promising to eliminate your risk, the government does not want to risk some innovation going wrong.

Sure, businesses and consumers making their own decisions make mistakes. Then they learn from their mistakes, pick themselves up, and try again and usually do better. But Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the recent financial panic and the coming rise in interest rates and inflation, are a few near-term reminders of how government can make mistakes, real whoppers. Long experience over the centuries has shown that mistakes by the government are the bigger risk. When we accept the Bad Deal and surrender our freedom of action to the government, who will protect us from the government’s mistakes?

Of Bubbles and Treasury Debt

Over the last decade our economy has been buffeted by what appears to be an accelerating series of economic bubbles. It is more than coincidence that this has occurred while government interference in the economy has increased.

That is not to deny that free markets are fully capable of producing economic bubbles, as market participants miscalculate investment risks and rewards and copy-cat each other as they do so. These market participants, however, if left to their own devices will also pay the price for their mistakes. Knowledge that they are at risk acts as a moderator and corrector, limiting the degree of risk investors are willing to take in the first place (and the willingness of lenders to provide money to support the bubble), and leaving the way clear for other investors to come in and pick up the debris (at a profit) when the bubble bursts.

When government is involved non-economic factors are inserted into the calculation of risk, and they affect who pays for the risk. With the existence of federally-supported mortgage guaranties, investors paid very little attention to whether mortgage lenders verified the ability of borrowers to make payments. A government guaranty always means that risks will be undervalued and that someone else (usually the taxpayer) gets to pick up the tab for the miscalculation.

It is neither exaggeration nor hyperbole to recognize that for more than a year the government has been handing out guaranties at a rate never before seen in the history of mankind. That is to say, that mountains of financial risk miscalculations have been made and are being made every day, and the unavoidable consequences are accumulating.

Perhaps the most dangerous miscalculations are those involving the debt issued by the U.S. Treasury. Investors are mistakenly acting as if there is no risk in placing their money in Treasury securities. These investors overlook the risk that buying Treasury securities--with an effective interest rate of 4 one-hundredths of one percent (the rate last week for 1-month Treasuries)--puts investors at risk if interest rates rise even a little bit and exposes the investors to even mild inflation.

Inflation is unlikely to remain mild. Along with all those government guaranties there has been a mountainous accumulation of new money provided by the federal government. All that money has to go somewhere. Right now it is awaiting some slight shock to send it avalanching down on the economy. Much of that money is for the moment being hoarded by investors and businesses afraid to spend it or put it to work while economic prospects remain unsettled and policymakers keep confusing the markets with one economic policy, regulation, restriction, or plan after another. No one wants to play the game while the referees are adjusting the rules.

So the government money makers keep pushing more money out to fund investment even while they toy with new disincentives to investment. People park the money instead in bank deposits (which are growing at record levels) and Treasuries (driving Treasury interest rates down to almost nothing).

That will not continue. At some point, the willingness of investors to hold dollars in accounts earning practically nothing will have played out. They will get their fill of Treasury securities. Foreign investors are already there, in recent weeks reducing their holdings of U.S. Treasury debt. Treasury interest rates will have to rise to attract investors, but as Treasury interest rates rise those who invested in Treasuries at very low interest rates will be on the losing side of their investment. They will start unloading their Treasury investments, further driving Treasury prices down and interest rates up, causing even more losses to those who invested in recent months in the Treasury bubble.

The spiral will be hard to stop, particularly as the Administration will be desperately trying to borrow more money, unheard of new amounts of money, to fund their planned multi-trillion dollar deficits. Interest rates will have to go up very high very fast in order to fund that voracious new appetite of the government for debt. The high interest rates will choke off many new sparks of economic recovery, leaving a lot of money around chasing after fewer goods and services for sale.

The Treasury bubble will likely end in a race that we have not seen for more than a quarter century. The race will be on for which will go higher, inflation or interest rates.

Of Guaranties and Reliance

All around the world people are seeking guaranties against the various risks of life. Borrowers want guaranties that they can stay in their houses, even if they cannot pay the mortgage; lenders want guaranties that they will not lose money on bad mortgages; investors want guaranties against bad investments; people living at the water’s edge want guaranties against floods; and even people making guaranties are looking for guaranties that they will not lose money on the guaranties that they have made to others. Guaranties of health, guaranties of wealth, guaranties of safety and happiness, all seem to be in ever increasing demand.

Perhaps what is most disturbing is that people are not just seeking guaranties, but they are looking for others to pay for them. Rather than relying upon their own resources and performance to obtain guaranties, too many are substituting pleas and moans and whines to wheedle free guaranties from others, especially from the government.

In practice, many of these guaranties will fail. Even guaranties from government are unreliable. I recall when a Senator for whom I worked was faced by an agitated constituent, complaining that a government agency reneged on a promise. There was not anything that the Senator could do about the situation, other than to remind the constituent of an important truth about government: they lied.

There is a source of reliable, faithfully honored guaranties. The ancient American prophet Mormon taught a congregation of Christians, “the way whereby ye may lay hold on every good thing.” The way is through faith on Jesus Christ, by whom people from the beginning of time obtained all things worth having, “and thus through faith, they did lay hold upon every good thing” (Moroni 7:21,25).

Unlike many of the guaranties of men and governments, these guaranties are sure, and they also require some reliance by the individual upon his own efforts in order to qualify. In modern times the Savior Jesus Christ has said, “I, the Lord, am bound when ye do what I say; but when ye do not what I say, ye have no promise.” (Doctrine and Covenants 82:10)

The qualifying requirements are not onerous. They relate directly to the promises sought. For guaranties of goodness, the Lord asks us to be kind. For guaranties of financial wellbeing, the Lord asks us to follow practices of financial prudence. For guaranties of happy family life, the Lord asks that we love and serve each other. That is to say, to obtain the Lord’s sure guaranties, we are asked to rely jointly upon ourselves and upon the Lord.

The result was summed up by the counsel of another ancient American prophet, Helaman, that he gave to his own sons:

And now, my sons, remember, remember that it is upon the rock of our Redeemer, who is Christ, the Son of God, that ye must build your foundation; that when the devil shall send forth his mighty winds, yea, his shafts in the whirlwind, yea, when all his hail and mighty storm shall beat upon you, it shall have no power over you to drag you down to the gulf of misery and endless wo, because of the rock upon which ye are built, which is a sure foundation, a foundation whereon if men build they cannot fall. (Helaman 5:12)

That is a guaranty worth having, and well within the budget of each one of us.