In
the 1990s I was part of a congressional delegation to Argentina. At that time the Argentine economy was
growing strongly and steadily, inflation was low, the currency was pegged to
the dollar, convertible 1-for-1. Trade
barriers were being lowered, commerce was booming. I recall asking Argentines what could
possibly darken what seemed to be a very bright future. They were quick to reply: “Here in Argentina we have no rule of law. You can have no confidence in getting justice
from the courts.”
That
reminded me of Washington Irving’s observation on a European judge, from his
famous work, The Alhambra:
It could not be denied, however, that he
set a high value upon justice, for he sold it at its weight in gold.
Not
long after that visit, the politics of income redistribution and confiscation
threw the Argentine economy into turmoil, where it has remained.
I
recently spoke with an economist friend of mine, who was waxing eloquent about
the attractive monetary and tax policies in Bulgaria. I remarked that this would probably invite foreign
investment. He replied, “No, there is no
rule of law there.”
The
point is that good economic policy cannot long survive inadequate legal
safeguards. Many businesses that made
major investments in China, attracted by a market of a billion people, have learned
that the lack of a reliable legal and justice system in China has undermined
much of the business value they thought to find. A similar story has been holding back
investment and economic development in Russia.
Bringing
that home, I would venture that concern for changing rules (or even lack of
rules)—the substitution of arbitrary bureaucratic powers in Washington over objective
rule of law—has been inhibiting more robust investment in the United States, a
major cause for our current anemic economic recovery.
An
ancient king in the Western Hemisphere, named Mosiah, warned, “because all men
are not just it is not expedient that ye should have a king or kings to rule
over you.” (Mosiah 29:16) Because men
are not consistently just, freedom has historically rested upon rule by law
rather than rule by men.
Fundamentally,
that was the very reason for the American Revolution. Our revolution was based on the rule of law, an
assertion of the rule of law, a
response to violations of the rule of law by the English king and parliament. Most of the Declaration of Independence is a
lengthy litany of violations of law by the English rulers. The Revolution was designed to take power away
from man and men and rest it upon laws and rights, soon to be secured by a
written supreme law embodied in the Constitution. Any erosion in the force and effect of the
Constitution is an erosion of the rule of law and of the freedoms that rely
upon law for their defense.
The
Progressive Movement that thrived about a century ago, and found a major
advocate in the federal government in President Woodrow Wilson, aggressively
proposed an alternative to the rule of law.
This program was the Rule of Experts.
Their new view—and it really was a very old view though they dressed it
up in modern-sounding rhetoric—was that there are Benign People, Experts, who
know the process of modern government better than most people do, to whom we can
safely yield governing authorities.
It
sounds akin to the ancient theory of Divine Right of Kings, that the monarchs
of the world are chosen by God and endowed with greater wisdom and perspective
than the average man and woman. To their
benign expertise and fatherly care was to be entrusted the governance of the
rest of us.
The
modern Rule of Experts people have much the same view, that these experts were
endowed by their universities and other sources of expertise with ability far
above that of most, and it would be wise to trust ourselves to their benign care. Not very democratic, and in fact these Benign
Experts make no secret of their impatience with the Congress and other
constitutional brakes on arbitrary authority.
As
King Mosiah wisely pointed out that men are not always just, it is also
appropriate to recognize that putting men in government does not make them any
more reliably wise than the rest of us.
The American Founders thought to address this problem by dividing
political power among not only three branches in the Federal Government but
also by embracing the federal system of dividing government with the States.
The
current regulatory structure and program of the United States rest heavily on
the idea that Benign Experts should be entrusted with authority for many of the
big questions facing Americans and for many of the much smaller questions, too. That is certainly the structure of the
Dodd-Frank Act, to offer one recent, prominent example among many.
Charles
Calomiris, of the Columbia University business school, described the theory of
the Dodd-Frank Act and related regulations this way:
The implicit theory behind these sorts
of initiatives, to the extent that there is a theory, is that the recent crisis
happened because regulatory standards were not quite complex enough, because
the extensive discretionary authority of bank supervisors was not great enough,
and because rules and regulations prohibiting or discouraging specific
practices were not sufficiently extensive.
(Charles W. Calomiris, “Meaningful
Banking Reform and Why it Is so Unlikely,” VoxEU,
January 8, 2013)
This
program of federal regulation has been imposed increasingly in contravention of
the basic constitutional principle of separation of powers, by merging
legislative, executive, and judicial authority in “independent” regulatory
agencies. The unelected federal
regulator today decides the details and specifics of binding mandates,
identifies violators of those regulations, assesses guilt, and applies
penalties.
Taken
together our current regulatory system, by merging rather than maintaining the
separation of powers of the Constitution, is eroding the rule of law. It is returning us to the age old practice of
rule by men, with all of the potential for abuse of rights and freedoms, abuses
that fill up most of the sadder pages of human history.
During
the debate over the creation of the new financial consumer Bureau, Senate
Banking Committee Chairman Dodd boasted that with this new agency people would
no longer have to come to Congress for the enactment of new consumer laws. The Bureau would take care of all that.
There
are serious operational flaws—too often overlooked—in the program of governance
by Benign Experts. First, the regulators
are not dispassionate umpires, limited to calling the balls and strikes. These umpires are also players in the game, the
federal agencies each having their own set of particular interests and
incentives that they take care of first.
Second,
reliance on Benign Experts assumes an unproven, undemonstrated level of
knowledge, insight, and forecasting skills.
AEI President Arthur Brooks, in his book, The Battle, provides one of many examples of this flaw:
Federal Reserve economists were still
forecasting significant positive growth and moderate unemployment in May and
June 2008. They believed that economic
growth in 2009 would be 2.4 percent, and unemployment would be 5.5
percent. What we experienced instead was
negative growth, double-digit unemployment, and the destruction of at least $50
trillion in worldwide wealth. No one can
get the numbers exactly right, to be sure.
But getting them this much wrong certainly lends a whole new meaning to
the expression ‘margin of error.’
(Arthur C. Brooks, The Battle, p.46)
It
is not that regulators are dumber than the rest of the population, but they are
no smarter either. The regulatory
problems are increasingly too great for any designated group of humans to
solve.
Third
flaw, mission creep: power attracts
power. Even if the tasks are too great,
require too much knowledge, insight, foresight, and other skills in
unachievable degree, the regulators still take them on, especially if the task
increases the reach and influence of the agency.
I
offer two examples from an example-rich environment.
Basel
III capital rules started from a simple idea, that banks all around the world
should be subject to the same capital standards. Capital (the financial cushion a bank carries
against losses) is one of the three key elements of sound banking, the other
two being liquidity and earnings. These international
rules did not remain simple. Developed
by an international team of experts from around the world, who labored on them
for years, the rules number hundreds of pages, affecting the entire financial
structure and business model of a bank, any bank. Congress was not involved and has no
particular role in approving the rules. When
exposed to public review they attracted thousands of comment letters expressing
dismay that they are a bad fit for the U.S. economy. In the end, though, the regulators can go
ahead with what they alone think is best.
A
second example would be the Federal Reserve.
One hundred years ago this year the Fed was created with a specific,
identifiable, and rather narrow purpose, to provide liquidity for the banking
system in times of financial stress. Before
long, the Federal Reserve gained control of monetary policy and built up the
practice of controlling interest rates.
Later, it was given the task of promoting maximum employment. Under Dodd-Frank the Federal Reserve’s role
in supervising banks and bank holding companies was expanded to supervising any
financial business considered to be significant for financial stability. Each of these powers has drawn the Federal
Reserve away from its narrow, objective task, to broad fields of subjective
authority.
Perversely,
this expansion of authority into more judgmental areas is eroding the
independence of the Federal Reserve, making it yet one more political player in
Washington, with responsibilities that far exceed human ability to fulfill, but
which reach to every business and every home.
The Fed’s prolonged policy of keeping short-term interest rates at or about
zero has penalized all who save and live off of their savings, transferring
trillions of dollars from savers to borrowers, the biggest borrower being the
Federal Government, a policy decided by a small group of Washington experts.
I
offer a partial but simple solution to point us back toward strengthening the
rule of law and reducing our exposure to the rule of man and men, however expert
they might be. Return the lawmaking and
the policy decisions to the elected representatives. It is a messy process, but exactly the messy
process that the Founders intended to preserve freedom from the encroachment of
arbitrary and oppressive government. The
regulators, which are theoretically part of the executive branch, should be left
with the duty of implementing the laws and policy decisions that the elected
and accountable representatives make.
If
Congress were required to write the rules and mandates and delegate to the
executive agencies only the execution, the mandates of government would be circumscribed
by the limitations of a legislative body forced to be directly accountable for
what it has wrought. It is easy for
legislators to complain about bad regulatory decisions, when all too often
these are decisions that Congress never should have delegated to regulators in
the first place.
We
would still have laws and regulations, but the laws might be more direct and specific,
and perhaps fewer and surely smaller. We
would probably not have Dodd-Frank Acts that number thousands of pages read by
no congressman or Senator, containing a cacophony of
half-baked ideas and multiple solutions to the same problem, all left for the
regulators to sort out.
And
legislators might recall this caution, from Thomas Paine:
Laws difficult to be executed cannot be
generally good.
(Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man)